The $214M Loss Debate: A Breakdown of the IMF, BoG, and GoldBod Perspectives

On January 12, 2026, the Governor of the Bank of Ghana (BoG), Dr. Johnson Pandit Asiama, sat before the Public Accounts Committee (PAC) to answer a question that has been dominating the airwaves: Where did the $214 million (GH₵2.6B) go?

The session was intense. Lawmakers pressed for answers on reported "trading losses" within the national gold program, sparking a debate that goes beyond just accounting.

Breaking down Ghana Gold Board's $214 M "Loss" Debate

The Gatekeeper: Who is GoldBod?

To understand the "loss," you first have to understand the new player in town. Established by the Ghana Gold Board Act, 2025, GoldBod (the Ghana Gold Board) is now the sole legal authority for buying and exporting gold from small-scale miners.

On a daily basis, GoldBod acts as the national filter:

• The "Gatekeeper" Role: It licenses aggregators, tests (assays) the purity of every ounce, and ensures that gold once destined for smuggling routes is now captured by the state.

  
  

• The Mandate: Its mission isn't just to trade; it’s to formalize a sector that has leaked billions in value for decades.

  
  

The Partnership: Where the Bank of Ghana Comes In

GoldBod catches the gold, but the Bank of Ghana provides the firepower to keep it. In a strategic partnership, the BoG buys the gold collected by GoldBod using local Cedis.

This transaction is the engine of the Domestic Gold Purchase Programme. By paying in Cedis, the Bank builds a reserve of physical gold hitting a massive 110.99 tonnes by 2025, which serves as a buffer to protect the Cedi from crashing and reduces our desperate need for US Dollars to pay for imports.

The IMF Audit: Why They Call it a "Loss"

The friction started when the IMF’s 2025 review flagged a $214 million deficit sitting on the Bank of Ghana's books. The IMF’s argument is strictly mathematical:

• Incentive Pricing: To stop miners from selling to smugglers, the program pays them a competitive "incentive price."

• Operational Friction: High fees paid to GoldBod for assaying and aggregation added to the cost.

• The Verdict: From an auditor’s lens, spending more to acquire the gold than its immediate trading value looks like a "loss."

  
  

The Defense: "It’s a Premium, Not a Loss"

The BoG and GoldBod have fired back at this characterization. Their response is simple: You don't call an insurance premium a "loss."

They argue that the $214 million is a Strategic Policy Cost. By "losing" that money upfront, the state gained billions in reserve stability. If they didn't pay those incentive prices, the gold would simply be smuggled out of the country, leaving the Cedi vulnerable and inflation unchecked. As GoldBod’s CEO put it, the program was never designed to turn a profit; it was designed to save the economy.

The BOG Governor’s Comments

Rather than ending the program, a shift in strategy is now underway for 2026:

• Budgetary Shift: To protect the Bank’s books, the Ministry of Finance will now take over the "quasi-fiscal" costs of the program.

• Efficiency Reforms: The Governor called for reforming the program's efficiency and addressing operational bottlenecks.

• Transparency: An external audit is currently being conducted to provide further transparency and guide these future refinements.

  
  

Whether this strategy is ultimately viewed as a masterstroke of economic defense or a costly overreach remains to be seen as the new 2026 reforms take effect.